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The

discussion of values in this case belongs to the field of
social ethics.

States there is little disagreement about the desirability
w.

V

of the goal of oroviding an adequate level of medical care

2
to all persons.
sophisticated,

As our medical care has become more
more powerful,

and more expensive,

however,

some important questions have arisen about the meaning of
"providing an adequate level of medical
What is such an adequate level?
it?

Can v/e afford it?

care to all."

Are we capable of providing

If we can,

should it be the

job of

government or that of the private sector to provide it?
The definition of an adequate level

of medical

in part a function of our ability to provide it.

care is

Although

a serious attempt to determine such a level must be included
at some point in any definitive exploration of the issues
of the public role in health care financing,
make that attempt in this essay.

Instead,

I will not

I will accept as

adequate that level of care normally available to persons for
whom no major social or economic barriers to receipt of that
care exist.
The most common focus of complaints about the medical
care crisis is the issue of financial
for personal medical

cost.

Expenditures

care in the United States now exceed

nine percent of the gross national product.

Technically,

this figure could be allowed to increase until the diversion
of productive capacity to medical care led to health hazards
that exceeded new benefits.

There are,

however,

peting claims for those productive resources.

many com¬

As medical

care becomes more elaborate and demands for it more extra¬
vagant,

a point may be reached where social or ethical

3
considerations make further demands for medical care
invalid.

How can we balance our desire for medical care

against our desire for other goods and services?
John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice is an attempt
to describe and to support with rational argument one
system of social

justice which may be used to determine

priorities in a complex society.

The conception of justice

which Rawls provides is developed in an ideal system.

Its

application to the real world is therefore accompanied by
all the problems that exist in the failure of the real world
to meet ideal conditions.

At the same time,

however,

the

principles of Rawls's theory are remarkably "American",
and may prove a useful yardstick against which to measure
American institutions.

For this purpose,

they have the

advantages of existing independently of the pulls of real
social and political forces,

and of lacking the complex and

weighty baggage of American constitutional law,

which pro¬

vides the basis for the final arbitration of social as
well as legal

justice in the United States today.

In this essay I will
medical care.

examine several means of financing

These correspond roughly to some of the

major proposals for national health insurance that have
been introduced in Congress.
Rawls's theory,

I hope,

with the aid of

to show that one of these approaches

4

presents an ethically preferable alternative to the others
and to the current system of medical care financing.

This

alternative is a federally financed program of comprehensive
medical care for all residents of the United States.
I hope that my primary audience will be in the health
care professions.
attempt to

Because of this,

summarize Rawls's v/ork,

it is necessary to
so that the form and

content of the discussions which follow will not be too
obscure.

Once this groundwork has been laid out,

I will

present an argument for the applicability of the theory
to the problem of health care financing.
move to the application of the theory,

Finally,

I will

using it to look

at the relative merits of five schemes of financing.

5

RAWLS'S THEORY OE JUSTICE

Rawls calls his theory "justice as fairness".

It

consists of principles that he claims would be adopted to
govern the basic structure of society by a group of free
and rational parties to a hypothetical "original position
of equality."^
contract theory,

Justice as fairness is a modern social
with its original position substituted

for the state of nature in traditional
theory.

social contract

This conception of justice is presented as a

logical result of the nature of the original position
and of the parties in that position.
Rawls's conception of justice is not finally
determined by the original position,

however.

Rather,

it

is the position that is determined by the conception of
justice.

In his 1958 essay,

"Justice as Fairness",

Rawls proposed the two principles of justice that are
found again m A Theory of Justice.

2

Yet his argument in

support of these principles is based on a different con¬
tract situation.

In A Theory of Justice,

while he generally

argues from the base of the original position,

he states

at the outset that the original position is "a purely
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a
certain conception of justice."

3

Indeed,

the final test

of the adequacy of the principles of justice is not based
on the original position at all,

but on how they accord

6
with our considered judgements.
While the principles for which Rawls argues are not
essentially tied to the original position,

that position,

and the details of the interpretation and application of
the principles,

are integral parts of Rawls's theory.

nature of society;
society;

The

the nature of the individuals within

and the nature of their participation,

their understanding of their participation,

and of

in that society

are all carefully defined and limited.
The result of these limits is an ideal theory of
justice for an ideal situation.
inadequacy of this result,

Rawls recognizes the

noting that the most important

and difficult problems for any theory of justice are those
that occur only in a non-ideal society.

He asserts,

however,

that ideal theory provides "the only basis for the system¬
atic grasp of these more pressing problems."^

Such a

grasp of some of the problems of access to health care
is the goal of this essay.

The Original Position
Rawls calls the situation in which the contracting
parties in justice as fairness initially join together the
original position.

The detailed description of this position

is an attempt to put forward the "most philosophically
favored interpretation of the initial choice situation for

7
the purposes of a theory of justice."

Such an inter¬

pretation should rest on a minimal set of assumptions,
each of which seems natural and not controversial.
The first of these assumptions is that the parties in
the original position share an understanding of the proper
subject and of the concept of justice.
called just or unjust.
acts,

laws,

Many things may be

Individual acts,

institutional

and societies may all be so characterized.

The parties in the original position are primarily concerned
with social

justice.

subject of social

They all recognize that the proper

justice is the basic structure of society.

This is so because the effects of that
profound.

structure are so

The basic structure determines

the way in which the major social institutions
distribute fundamental rights and duties and
determine
the division of advantages from social
cooperation.?

If the basic structure is unjust,

then there will be no

consistent justice at all.
Their shared concept of justice is that it is the
proper balance between competing claims within a society.
The parties may differ as to what constitutes a proper
balance,

and as to how it should be reached.

These are

the considerations of their individual conceptions of
justice,

which need not be in agreement as the parties

8
come to the original position.

All that they must

acknowledge at the outset is that it is Dossible to reach
a proper balance,

whatever that balance may be,

between

competing claims;

and that such a balance is the goal of

the development and adoption of a theory of justice.
The task in the original position is the development of
a "set of related principles for identifying the relevant

Q
considerations which determine" what a proper balance is.
Another major assumption in the original position is
of the limitations on the nature of society.
in question is a totally self-contained social

The society
system.

is also what Rawls calls a well-ordered society.

It

It is

designed to advance the good of its members and
effectively regulated by a public conception of
justice.
Thus it is a society in which everyone
accepts and knows that the others accept the same
principles of justice, and the basic social
institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy
these principles.

These limitations are adopted by Rawls as simplifying
assumptions,

with the recognition that they define an

idealized society.
The society in question must also be necessary or
desirable

to its members.

Certain simple conditions,

which are accepted as part of the original position,

exist.

While no member of the society is able to dominate all
others,

it may be necessary for all to

join together to

avoid being subjugated by a second society.

Additionally,

the conditions in which the society exists are conditions
of moderate scarcity.

Goods and the means of acquiring

them are neither present in Edenic abundance,
cooperation unnecessary,

nor are they so

cooperative efforts are doomed to fail.

making

scarce that

10

Rawls makes two more major assumptions about the
structure of society.

He calls these conditions chain

connection and close-knitness.

Chain connection says

that whenever the position of the least advantaged class
is improved,
improved.

the positions of all classes of society are

It makes no statement about what happens when

the position of the least advantaged is not improved.
Close-knitness covers that possibility by saying that any
change in the basic

structure changes the absolute position

of all classes of society.

Thus a benefit for any class

in society is a benefit for all classes,

and a loss for

one is a loss for all.1'^
It is not at all clear that this can be held to be the
case in any real society.
however,

If it could be made to be true,

it would simplify all of tne functions of society.

Conflicts would never result from the utilitarian practice
of damaging the overall interests of some for the benefit
of others.

One group might derive benefit from a change

that limited the degree of benefit to others,

but it would

10
not be allowed to benefit by changes that removed all
benefits to another group.

The closest any real society

may come to this ideal is to attempt to pass legislation
that seriously tries to effect it.
The assumptions of chain connection and close-knitness
are in essence the rules behind consensus decision making.
If any party in a consensus seeking process feels that the
disadvantages of a proposal outweigh its benefits,
party can veto the proposal.

that

While this method of decision

making usually elicits altruistic behavior from those
involved,

altruism is not required of them.

Rather,

it is

freely chosen by them either because they value altruism
per se,

or because they recognize that it is central to

the successful functioning of a group whose successful
functioning they value.
Mandating chain connection and close-knitness similarly
tends to emphasize the social effects of any choice.

A

decision that benefits a large majority of a society may
have certain undesired costs for the minority.

If the

personal benefits to the many are great enough,

and the

personal harm to the few slight enough,
outcome for the few may still be (and,
ceived as)

however,
hopefully,

the net
be per¬

a benefit, because of the positive influence of

the decision on social stability and cooperation.
One reason that the structure of United States society
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does not appear clearly to be more chain connected and
close-knit than it does is that the effects on social
stability and cooperation of individual acts of social law
are usually seen as trivial.

The stabilizing effects of

federal social policies as a whole,
trivial.

however,

are not

In order to maximize the stabilizing effects of

any social legislation,

we should maximize its compliance

with chain connection and close-knitness.
In addition to such social considerations,

Rawls

notes certain facts about the parties in the original position.
The various parties are similar,
other.

but not identical to each

While they have certain shared needs and interests,

they also have individual

interests that may be either

complementary or conflicting.

Each party has a preference

for an individual plan of life based on an individual set
of values.
One common fact about the parties is that they are
what Rawls refers to as continuing persons.

While they

are not assigned duties to those who will succeed them in
society,

their interests do include consideration of at

least some of those in the next succeeding generation.
Thus,

for example,

the interests of parents could be

expected to include those of their children.

12

This

condition is necessary to assure the continuity of a wellordered society under the permanently binding agreement

12
that the parties in the original position are to reach.
This sense of continuity leads to Rawls's just savings
principle,

which requires a level of savings which

equitably distributes advantages among current and
succeeding generations.^
Finally,
rationality.

the parties exercise mutually disinterested
They are able to assign priorities to the

elements of their plans of life,

and they act in ways that

are calculated to maximally satisfy these plans.
this without envy for the position of others.
of rationality is central to
to

14

justice as fairness.

simplify discussion of that nature,

They do
The nature
In order

I will first com¬

plete the description of the original position in which the
individuals'

rationality is called into play.

In order to strengthen the argument for justice as
fairness,

Rawls seeks to rely upon a minimal number of

assumptions.

This approach is necessary to minimize

criticism of the theory.

It is also a reasonable approach

for the group of diverse parties in the original position.
It is desirable to minimize the grounds for disagreement
among them.

The process of deriving principles of justice

proceeds from these minimal assumptions.

The set of

assumptions is enlarged only so long as it is insufficient
to support a significant set of principles of justice.
Rawls assumes tnat such a set of principles can be developed
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while the assumptions are still reasonably limited.
The test of the adequacy of the set of principles is
that they "match our considered judgements."

16

Rawls calls

the state of affairs that exists when this test is met
reflective equilibrium.
equilibrium,

In the attempt to reach reflective

both the considered

judgements and the proposed

set of principles will change as they shed light on one
another.

Considered judgements are not guaranteed to be

flawless.

Rather,

All judgements are likely to be erroneous or to be
influenced by an excessive attention to our own interests.
Considered judgements are simply those rendered under
conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of
justice, and therefore in circumstances where the more
common excuses ,-pnd explanations for making a mistake
do not obtain.'

In order to minimize the effects of undue self-interest in
the original position,

Rawls introduces one of the most

important aspects of the original position,

the veil of

ignorance.
The veil of ignorance is a device that makes it possible
for the parties in the original position to reach agreement.
It denies to each party any knowledge of his or her par¬
ticular situation.

While the general facts about the

nature and behaviors of human societies are known to the
parties,

specific details of their own society and of their

own social position,

wealth,

income,

relative intelligence

14
and strength,

and personal plans of life are all unknown.

It is therefore impossible for any of the parties to ration¬
ally propose any principle of justice that would enhance his
or her individual prospects more than those of any other
party.

Instead,

the parties can only advance their own

interests in the most general ways.

In order to insure

that a principle proposed in the original position will be
beneficial to any one party,
benefit to all parties.

it must necessarily be of

This effect of the veil of ignor-

ance is crucial to the theory of justice as fairness.

18

Rawls also places certain limits on the alternatives
that the parties in the original position may consider.
These "constraints on the concept of right" are as follows:

A conception of right is a set of principles, general
in form and universal in application, that is to be
publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for
ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons.
Principles of justice are identified by their special
role and the subject to which they apply. 19

These conditions
ordering,

(generality,

and finality)

universality,

publicity,

will be true of any principles of

justice for a well-ordered society which have been
rationally agreed to in the original position.

They may

also prove particularly helpful in deciding whether a
given social institution satisfies the principles of justice.

A

15
Rationality
The parties in the original position are mutually
disinterested and rational.
affected by envy,

That is,

the parties are un¬

and they try their best to advance their

private interests.

While in the original position,

they do not know what these interests are.

Instead,

however,
they

assume simply that they would prefer more rather than less
of the social goods that are generally necessary to the
accomplishment of any plan of life.

20

The nature of this

preference is peculiar in that it refuses to accept any
risk of loss in exchange for an increased chance of gain.
Rawls assumes that any rational decision to accept a risk
must be based on judgements of the probability of loss
which have a basis in known facts.

Since the necessary

facts are hidden by the veil of ignorance,

it is irrational

to accept any risk in the original position.

21

Since the parties may not knowingly accept any risks,
and since they all know that each of them has an equal
chance of being in the least advantaged position in society,
they are led to accept what Rawls calls the maximin rule.
Under this rule,

they select a set of principles of justice

which guarantees that the worst possible outcome is least
bad.

In choosing in accordance with this rule,

the parties

may be forced to give up a set of principles in which the
best possible outcome or the average outcome is clearly

16
superior to the best or average outcome of the chosen set
of principles.

This would seem to be

justified,

because

the parties are unable to estimate the probabilities of any
of the outcomes,

and the relative cost of a unit loss to

the least advantaged party may well be unacceptable while
the relative cost of a unit loss to the most advantaged
will,

in all likelihood,

be easily acceptable.

Rawls provides a second rationale for the maximin rule
in the principle of responsibility to self.
required to avoid all risks,
worthwhile.

One is not

only those that are not

One must be able to affirm,

possible outcome should occur,

even if the worst

that the choice to assume

the risk of that outcome was worthwhile when considered
against the potential gains.

22

Since the parties are

seeking to advance their interests by securing primary
goods,

and since there must be some quantity of primary

goods that constitutes a functional minimum,

the parties

would violate their responsibility to self if they were
to accept less than that minimum.

While such an accept¬

able minimum might in a wealthy society be far below the
maximin,

it is likely to be similar to it under the assumed

condition of moderate scarcity.
The maximin rule is only justified when no reasonable
estimates of the relative probabilities of various outcomes
are possible.

It holds in the original position,

but fails

17
once the veil of ignorance is lifted enough for the
individuals to know the specifics of their society,
of their plans of life.
rational

or

Outside of the original position,

choice is still governed by certain principles,

but the essential

task of assigning relative values to

various outcomes is necessarily left to the individuals'
subjective preferences.
Taken as a whole,

23
Rawls's principles of rational choice

tend to maximize the realization of goals while minimizing
the expense of means.

The first of the three principles

is that of effective means.

It states that,

given a

particular objective and several alternative means to achieve
it

(those means being otherwise neutral),

then we are to

choose the alternative that realizes the objective with the
least expense of means;

or,

given the means and several

different ways of employing them to achieve the objective,
we are to achieve the objective as fully as possible.
next principle is that of inclusiveness.
given two plans,

The

It states that,

we are to choose the one that achieves all

of the objectives of the other plan plus at least one more
objective.

(Tnis principle is inapplicable if neither plan

includes all of the goals of the other.)
is that of greater likelihood.

The last principle

This states that,

plans with essentially the same goals,

given two

and given further

that one has a greater chance of achieving some of its goals

18
without at the same time a lesser chance of achieving the
rest,

then we are to choose the plan that has the greater

likelihood of success.

24

These principles govern the process of choosing one's
plans,

a process Rawls calls deliberative rationality.

In this process one chooses a plan after reviewing

in the light of all the relevant facts, v/hat it
would be like to carry out these plans and thereby
[ascertaining] the course of action that would2c.
best realize [one's] more fundamental desires. ^

Several assumptions accompany this process.
errors in calculation,
facts.

Also,

reasoning,

It includes no

or assessment of the

the deliberating person has a complete and

accurate understanding of his or her own desires,
the situation,

and of

including all relevant circumstances.

An

individual who selects a plan under these constraints will
select an objectively rational plan.
the case,

If,

as is generally

it is impossible to have complete and accurate

information,

then the individual will

select a subjectively

rational plan.^
The parties in the original position are rational
persons,

and all possess rational plans of life,

although

the specifics of those plans are hidden by the veil of
ignorance.
plan,

Rawls defines a rational plan of life as a

consistent with the principles of rational choice,

that a person would choose with full deliberative rationality 27

19
Since a plan of life is a long term plan,
not most,

much,

if

of the data necessary to chart a specific course

of action is unavailable.

The earliest steps in a rational

plan of life might be obvious, but later steps would hinge
on knowledge that is unavailable when the plan is formed.
The plan must incorporate a principle of postponement,
allowing certain details to be filled in at some future
time when the relative merits of various alternatives can
be assessed.

28

The less information a person has available

when forming a plan of life,

the more varied must be the

alternatives allowed by the plan.
position,

Thus,

in the opening

the parties' best chance of assuring the promotion

of their plans of life comes with maximizing the range of
possible alternatives.

It would be irrational for any of

them to agree to principles of justice that would reduce
this range if any less limiting principles could win
agreement.

Primary Goods
Rawls assumes that the basic structure of society is
concerned with the distribution of goods.The goods in
question need not be goods in the sense of merchandise;
they include anything that a person with a rational plan
of life might rationally want.

Those things that would be

such goods for any person are human goods.^

Those human

20
goods which a rational person would want,
of whatever else he or she might want,

regardless

and regardless of

the details of his or her plan of life,

are primary goods.

31

The primary goods can be categorized in various ways.
Rawls differentiates social primary goods and natural
primary goods.
opportunities,

Among the former he lists rights,
income,

and wealth.

powers,

These are social goods

because they are defined and regulated by the basic structure
of society,

through its major institutions.

natural goods Rawls lists health,
imagination.
over these,

Among the

intelligence,

and

Although the basic structure has some influence
•

•

•

there are distinct limits to that influence.

Another primary good,
natural,

vigor,

32

33

which is neither strictly social nor

is self-respect.

Rawls considers self-respect the most important primary
good.

This good has two parts.

The first part is a sense

of the value of one’s plan of life.
depends,

at least in part,

Such a sense generally

on the respect of others.

out the knowledge that others appreciate one's plan,
difficult to retain a sense of its worth.

With¬
it is

Only when that

sense of worth is maintained can one pursue one's goals
with enthusiasm and can one delight in their fulfillment.
The second part of self-respect is confidence in one's
ability to pursue one's plan of life.

Following a plan

under a cloud of self-doubt is difficult and discouraging.

21
Self-respect is for Rawls the most important primary good,
because without it "all desire and activity becomes empty
and vain,

34

and we sink into apathy and cynicism."^

The primary goods are included among the things that
any rational person wants precisely because they are
necessary to the pursuit of any rational plan of life.
The parties in the original position cannot bargain away
any of these without being sure that in doing so the worst
possible position in which they might find themselves when
the veil of ignorance is lifted is being improved.

Rawls's Conception of Justice
Rawls uses these assumptions,

definitions,

and deriv¬

ations to support a general and a special conception of
justice.

The general conception is as follows:

All social values -- liberty and opportunity, income
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect -- are to
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
of any, or all, of these values is to the advantage of
the least favored.35

In order to simplify the application of this conception,
Rawls develops a special case of it,

which consists of two

principles and two priority rules.

First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

22
Second Principle [The Difference Principle]
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan¬
taged, consistent with the just savings principle,
and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical
order and therefore liberty can be restricted only
for the sake of liberty. . .
Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over
Efficiency and Welfare)
The second principle of justice is lexically prior
to the principle of efficiency and to that of
maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity
is prior to the difference principle.
There are two
cases:
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance
the opportunities of those with the lesser
opportunity;
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance
mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship.
In interpreting the relative advantage that any social
arrangement holds for the least favored,

that advantage is

to be interpreted in terms of the benefits it presents for
the plans of life of the people in the least favored class.
The general conception of justice defines in the
broadest terms the distribution of social goods that the
basic structure of a just society should provide.

It is a

straightforward result of the maximin rule subject to all
of the constraints of the original position:
ality of the parties,

the veil of ignorance,

on the concept of right,

the ration¬
the constraints

the proper subject of justice,

nature of a well-ordered society.

the
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The special conception of justice is less easily
derived from the original position,
priority rules.
from obvious.

because of its

The lexical priority of liberty is far
It states that the demands of equal and

maximal liberty be met regardless of the effect on social
and economic inequalities.

The potential injustice

resulting from the application of such a statement in
the real world is obvious.

It is unclear,

however,

that

the radical dissociation of liberties from social and
economic status presents a meaningful possibility.

Rawls's

own interpretation of the first priority rule is "that the
basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of
wealth and authority in ways consistent with the equal
liberties required."
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Such an arrangement should be

possible in the ideal society being built by the parties in
the original position.
Historically,

however,

wealth and power have not

been distributed in accordance with the principle of equal
liberties.

This creates the problem of perpetuating de

facto inequalities of liberty by imposing the radical
priority of liberty on a society frought with economic and
political injustice.

The installation of justice as

fairness as the new basis for a previously unjust society
may require serious and extraordinarily difficult redis¬
tribution of primary goods before meaningful equality of
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liberty exists.

The problem,

aside from the difficulty of

developing a constitution and legislation that would
actually work to implement justice as fairness,

stems in

the end from the fact that a well-ordered society is the
only society in which Rawls's theory can be applied without
major changes.

The importance of the theory is that it

provides a clear ideal toward the realization of which
society may strive,

but which it can at best approximate.

Rawls argues that it is rational for the parties in
the original position to accept the priority of liberty
because of the effects of doing so on the bases of selfrespect.

He states that it is through the public guarantee

of equal liberties that the parties in the original position
will assure themselves of the respect of others that is
crucial to their self-respect.

The assurance of maximal

and equal liberty further assures the parties that they will
be allowed the greatest possible latitude in framing their
plans of life.

While trading wealth for liberty might

accord with certain specific plans of life,
of liberty might,

sooner or later,

the sacrifice

irrevokably block the

execution of those or many other plans of life.

By

assuring the right to choose and carry out a wide variety
of plans,
parties'

the priority of liberty tends also to assure the
self-respect.

IQ
7

Rawls further supports the priority of liberty by
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invoking its stabilizing effect on society.

In a society

that affirms the paramount importance of equal and
maximal liberties,

the bases of self-respect are at least

to an extent assured by the status of equal citizenship.
In a society where wealth or social
most important,

status is considered

there will be a tendency for one's self-

respect to vary in accordance with one's share in these.
Those with relatively less self-respect would try to
improve their position by increasing their wealth or
social

status.

In a self-contained society,

however,

this

is often only possible by reducing the wealth or status of
another.

The persons in such a society have an incentive

for competition rather than for cooperation.

The mutual

disinterest of the parties would no longer be a natural
assumption.
Social union,
harmony,

Envy,

jealousy,

and mistrust would be likely.

with its attendant stability and sense of

would be extremely unlikely.
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The priority of

liberty thus helps to provide that measure of coordination
and stability which is essential to the viability of any
human community.
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The second priority rule is that fair equality of
opportunity takes precedence over the distribution of
social and economic goods.

Fair equality of opportunity

may not be sacrificed to increase economic gain for either
the least advantaged or society as a whole.

Truly fair
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equality may only be possible if society assumes certain
burdens of a remedial nature.

Special educational oppor¬

tunities and affirmative action programs are examples of
such measures that might be used to help provide truly equal
opportunities for certain socially disadvantaged groups.
The second priority rule is thus a statement of the economic
and social priority of guaranteeing that historic and social
fortune will not deprive an individual of a meaningfully
equal chance to compete in the employment marketplace.

It

is a statement of economic commitment to the priority of
liberty.
The two priority rules are not absolute and inviolable.
While lexical ordering is,

by definition,

absolute,

the

impossibility of strictly separating basic equal rights
from equal opportunity,
inequalities,

and both from social and economic

may make observation of absolute priority

violate our best considered judgements.

In such cases

the general conception of justice is the principle to
which final appeal is made.

The role of priority rules is

that of reducing the reliance on intuitive

judgements that

is necessary when trying to compare the value of liberty
v/ith that of wealth or social stature.
"while it

.

.

.

A lexical order,

cannot be strictly correct

.

.

.

may be an

illuminating approximation under certain special though
•
. .
. .
U9
significant conditions."

The general conception pro-
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vides the correction factor when the lexical order fails
to satisfy the test of reflective equilibrium.

Application of the Principles of Justice
Part of the theory of justice as fairness is a
description of how it is to be put into practice.
suggests a four stage sequence.

Rawls

The first stage is the

process of defining and accepting principles of justice.
(Rawls's theory includes his version of the principles.)
The second stage is that of a constitutional convention to
frame a constitution in agreement with these principles.
The government established by that constitution then
performs the third stage,
Finally,

the enactment of just legislation.

the executive and judicial officers of the

government implement,

enforce,

and interpret the laws on

the level of individual actions.
first,

At each stage after the

the veil of ignorance is lifted to allow the persons

working at each stage to have the information that they
need to maximize the appropriateness of their efforts.
Not until individual,

personal details are necessary in

applying the laws does the veil of ignorance lift so high
as to allow any knowledge of such details.
Throughout,
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it is clear that the principles of justice

are put into effect by a formal governmental body.

This

is necessary because there must be an arbiter of competing
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claims,

and because there must be a party whose only

interest is justice and whose

job it is to perform the

distributions of primary goods that are necessary in
order to maintain a just and stable order.

Rawls suggests

branches of the government with the tasks of maintaining
a fair,

competitive market sector;

assuring the avail¬

ability of enough to work to assure reasonably full
employment;
minimum;
of (1)

assuring the provision of the agreed social

and managing a scheme of taxation for the purposes

gradually and continually redistributing wealth so

that the distribution does not subvert the principle of
equal liberties,

and (2)

providing the revenues necessary

for any transfer payments required for a distribution of
goods in accordance with the second principle,
.

.

principle.
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the difference
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THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AS A MODEL
FOR UNITED STATES SOCIAL POLICY

The principles of the priority of equal liberty and
of equal opportunity are well established in American
constitutional law.

The Bill of Rights,

the due process

and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment,
and a multitude of court decisions have firmly established
these principles.

They have also provided judicial remedy

in many cases in which legislation enabling effective
exercise of these rights has been lacking.

Detailed

analysis of the law in this regard is beyond the scope
of this essay.
The congruence of the difference principle with the
American system is less obvious.

The distribution of

inequalities so that they are to the benefit of the least
advantaged has no specific parallel in the constitution
or in its interpretation.

However,

something like the

difference principle can be seen at work in the presence of
a significant system of welfare rights and benefits which
has existed,

in one form or another,

course of United States history.

throughout the entire

In order to elucidate

the principles behind the welfare functions of modern
America,

it is necessary to examine the roots of those

rights and benefits.
The heart of public welfare policy

in the United

States,

from earliest colonial days to the twentieth

century,

/-

was set out in the English poor law of 1601,
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and in the laws simplifying the establishment of charitabl
.
trusts in 1597 and 1601.
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These laws marked the reso¬

lution of a problem that had been growing in England
since the fourteenth century.

This problem was the

appearance for the first time of a class of able-bodied
poor who were eager to work,

but for whom no work could

be found.
Until

the sixteenth century,

toward the poor had been simple.

the English attitudes
Those who were unable

to work and who lacked families who could support them
were supported,

either by church alms or by publicly

accepted begging.
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Those who were able to work but were

unemployed were considered sinners and scoundrels,
were subject to punishment as vagrants.
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and

This harsh

attitude stemmed from a real problem with a large class
of roving criminal vagabonds,
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and a failure to

recognize that for many there was no work available.^
During the sixteenth century England turned further
toward a mercantile economy,
ment worsened.

and the problem of unemploy¬

The economic change,

impropriation of church lands,
arable land to pasture,
ployment.

along with the

led to the conversion of

which in turn caused rural unem¬

The rural poor

often

entered the towns and
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cities in search of work for which they were not trained,
creating a class of urban unemployed.
grew they caused growing concern,

As these groups

which generated a long

series of laws which first recognized that not all unem¬
ployment of the able-bodied was voluntary and to be
punished,

and then established programs to provide for the

needs of these people.

5?

The poor law of 1601

established a secular organization

to levy taxes for the support of the poor.

This hierarchy

was based locally and charged to look after the needs of
the poor within each parish.
compelled to act.

Rarely,

however,

did it feel

During the first twenty years of the

seventeenth century,

ninety-three percent of the poor relief

was provided by private charity.
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The laws encouraging private giving were the backbone
of the system.

Charitable giving,

the endowment of ongoing trusts,

largely in the form of

quadrupled in the period

1630-1620A*4 The capacity for government participation was
able to be held in reserve as the merchant and gentry
classes gave generously in response to the exhortations
of the clergy.
While the church was much less of a conduit for poor
relief than it had once been,

the Protestant ethic being

preached by the clergy effectively encouraged secular giving.
The rich were given their wealth in stewardship for all,

and had a religious duty to share it to ease the plight
of the less fortunate.

Charity,

however,

should be given

in such ways that the poor were benefited
well as in body.

in spirit as

The sin of indolence was not to be

encouraged by poorly thought out gifts.^

The taint of

evil was still firmly attached to some poverty.
The laws and attitudes concerning the poor were
brought to the English colonies in America,
formed the basis of colonial welfare policy.
colonies,

however,

that of England.
New World,

In the

the economic situation was quite unlike
During the first terrible years in the

famine and disease,

dominant problems.

where they

not unemployment,

were the

Survival required hard work.

Farming

techniques had to be adapted to new conditions in order to
yield harvests that provided more than bare subsistence.
At times,
essential.

mutual aid in even the smallest tasks was
During a smallpox epidemic in the Plymouth

colony in 1620,

In ye time of most distress, there wus but 6. or 7*
sound persons, who . . . spared no pains night nor
day, but . . . did all ye homly & necessarie offices
for them. 66

It rapidly became clear to the colonists that theirs were
communities in which all shared equally in the same hard
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life,

and the more work a person could do,

his or her value to the community.

the greater
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By the beginning of the eighteenth century the
colonies had become well
scattered settlements,

established.

ho longer a few

their population had reached

rO

250,000.

Mercantile centers along the coast provided

a base that buffered the effects of local crop failures.
A steady flow of new immigrants was attracted by the high
wages in a labor-short land.
workers to buy inexpensive,

The high wages enabled
rich farmland.

ingly endless supply of land,
labor was assured,
jobs m England.

With a seem¬

a continuous shortage of

in marked contrast to the shortage of
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These conditions of abundant land and scarce labor
continued into the nineteenth century,

forging the attitudes

towards charity in the young United States.

The colonial

poor laws were changed only to accomodate the terminology
of new monetary and governmental systems.

The minimal

needs of the truly impotent poor were met primarily through
the same kind of mutual aid that had been a feature of
society in America from the first colonies.

The religious

duty to work was strengthened by society's needs as much
as by New England Puritanism.
During over a century of chronic shortages of labor,
the concept of the worthy able-bodied poor was forgotten.

3^
The pauperism that was ubiquitous in sixteenth century
England was rare in the United States.

As one immigrant

wrote,

The Traveller's feelings are not harrowed at every
turn by the sight of some squalid, ragged, wretched
object in human shape.
Indeed, during the whole two
years of my residence in America, I saw but one
beggar . . .

The Tudor recognition that not all unemployment was
voluntary,

was irrelevant in a society with work for all.

There are no roundsmen [laborers on relief sent from
one employer to another to seek work] standing at the
corners of their streets all day idle.
To secure against
the inconveniences resulting from a scarcity of
labourers, some of the farmers take children of about
six or seven years as apprentices . . . The apprentice
is clothed, sent to school, and provided for until he
is capable of working )n the farm, when his master
. . . is amply repaid. >1

This idyllic report may have been true of the frontier,
but by the time of its publication in 1835 the urban
population had passed one million,

^

and poverty and

great hardship were common.
hany of the ugliest problems were the product of
bigotry and the self-interest of the powerful.

Hob

violence against aliens and freed slaves accepting low
wages,

Catholics exercising their freedom of religion,

or abolitionists their free speech was not uncommon.
the factories and mills of New England,

In

the ten hour day

35
was still over a decade away.

One Fall River employer

could speak of wearing out and discarding his laborers
like so many machines,

because their unskilled labor was

easily replaced from among the city's unemployed poor.

^

Not all of the wealthy were quite so unkind to the
poor.

Many recognized and tried to deal with the problem

of urban poverty.

The early nineteenth century proposals

provide more complex (if not necessarily more accurate)
explanations of the problem than did those of Tudor
England.

One listed nine prominent causes of pauperism:

ignorance,

idleness,

drunkenness,

lotteries,

pawnbrokers,

waste,

prostitution,

unwise marriages,

and charity.

The

way to respond to these causes was to give advice to the
poor on how they could better conduct their business.
In another consideration of the problem,
that poverty,
together,
sidered,

vice,

Josiah ^uincy wrote

and crime "are so frequently found

that in every general survey,

they may be con¬

for the purpose of analysis and remark,

measure as inseparable."^
legislature,
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in some

In a report to the Massachusetts

a committee chaired by ^uincy recommended

compulsory work-houses as the most effective and economical
solution to the problem of able-bodied poor.^

In none of

these reports does there appear any recognition of the fact
that had become clear in England more than two centuries
earlier:

poverty exists among the able-bodied because of
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unemployment,

not solely because of sinful behavior.

The old concept of poverty as evidence of personal
faults,
charity,

and faults easily aggravated by too generous
formed the basis of the dominant social policy

throughout the nineteenth century.
to aid the needy was not lost,

The Christian duty

but it was countermanded

by the idea that the poor were evil,
of aid.

and therefore unworthy

Publicly funded almshouses and mental hospitals

were rarely better than,

and often not separate from,

jails.

Many private charities stressed the role of advice in
helping the hopelessly poor to better themselves.

The

New York Association for Improving the Conditions of the
Poor was a much imitated example.

In instructions to its

volunteers it stated that its goals were

First, The moral and physical elevation of the poor;
and Second, . . . the relief of their necessities.
But this order, unhappily, has been too often
reversed. . . Our principles here are clear as a
sunbeam.
They show that it is worse to debase by
alms than to withhold them; that the physical must
be subservient to the moral, and the moral receive
the attention its paramount importance demands.66

The few who recognized that unemployment and inadequate
wages in the cities made poverty inescapable for many were
no match for the potent force of self-righteousness.
As the United States entered the twentieth century,
it did so with a seventeenth century system and fifteenth
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century attitudes toward its poor.
disgraceful lot of the lazy.

Poverty was the

The workhouse was the most

common way of dealing with the poor.
indentured or apprenticed out.

Children were still

Applicants for relief were

often required to swear that they were destitute and were
stripped of the right to vote or hold office.
this system had "proven"

Although

its adequacy during several brief

depressions in the nineteenth century,
and the Great Depression,
unemployed,
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the crash of 1929

with one fourth of the work force

made demands for public relief and private

charity that it was totally unable to meet.
The depression led to the implementation of "new"
ideas about the government's relation to the poor.

Clearly

one fifth of the work force had not been siezed by a fit
of mass indolence.

Their poverty was no more the result

of their own laziness than was that of the unemployed in
the reign of Elizabeth I.
States,

For the first time in the United

poverty among able-bodied persons who were eager to

work was severe enough to bring the government to recognize,
and to act to relieve,

unwanted and undeserved poverty.

With Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal a new understanding
of the role of government in helping the poor emerged.
basic values of work and charity did not change.

The

Rather,

the problem was recognized as being too big for any private
or local charity to solve.

Only a massive effort by the
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federal government would suffice to provide the help that
was needed.

In a 1932 campaign address,

Roosevelt said

that a person's right to life meant "the right to make a

-69

comfortable living,"

which m turn implied the right

of the needy to a share in the relief being provided by
their government.

No longer was poverty justified as a

part of God's divine order,

as it had been by many from

medieval England into twentieth century America.

No longer

would Adam Smith's argument for a free market,

with the

poverty that it always entailed,

The insight

of Elizabeth's government,

be accepted.

that there were able-bodied

poor who needed and merited help,

was finally rediscovered

and given application with a vengeance in the United States.
The New Deal marked a change in federal
economic policy,

from "benign neglect"

social and

to intervention,

an effort to guarantee a right to a decent life.
liberal

thinkers,

in

For many

this right grew out of basic freedoms.

In the words of Louis D.

Brandeis,

"Financial dependence

is consistent with freedom only where claim to support
rests upon right and not upon favor."
Relief Administrator Harry L.
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rederal Emergency

Hopkins concurred in 1936

when he wrote that "there is no need for any American to be
destitute,

to be illiterate,

to be reduced by the bondage

of these things into either political or economic
impotence."''7^

Congress passed and the courts upheld laws
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guaranteeing basic rights for workers.

The Social Security

Act of 1935 ana its amendments assumed the oldest recognized
poor relief burden -- the care of those too old,

too young,

or too infirm to work -- as well as the provision of
services for the unemployed,
public health work,

maternal and child health,

and health insurance for the poor and

the aged.
Throughout the last five hundred years,

the English

and American peoples have acknowledged the duty of society
to provide for its truly needy,

for its least advantaged

persons.

Variations in the nature of society,

problems,

and of its theories have led to varying

responses to that duty.

of its

The philosophy of the New Deal

and the Social Security Act,

as amended,

provide the

modern American response.
First,

the least advantaged members of society have a

right to a decent minimum standard of living.
with certain characteristics

(e.g.,

elderly,

Persons
disabled)

are ipso facto assumed to have legitimate claims to
society's aid.

Other persons without these character¬

istics may well have equally legitimate claims,

and must

not be subjected to undue humiliation in pressing them.
(It is recognized that,

unfortunately,

it is still humili¬

ating to many merely to press their claims.)
Second,

the duty to respond to the needs of the least
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advantaged cannot be left to the voluntary recognition
of those needs,

and action by,

those who are better off.

The bankruptcy of the theory of relying solely on voluntary
charity has been recognized since the sixteenth century.
The nineteenth century version of voluntarism,

in which

the wealthy attempted to permanently uplift instead of
temporarily relieve the poor did neither,
failed

also

and generally

to address social root causes of poverty.

The development during the past hundred years of
modern social sciences and statistical analysis have
helped to revolutionize the care of the poor.

They have

led to the realization that most of the causes of poverty
are beyond the control of any poor individual.

They have

aided in the development of the social work profession,
whose job is to help society carry out its duty to its
least advantaged,

and to help them to overcome the social

and economic forces that keep them in their disadvantaged
positions.
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Unfortunately,

neither the scientific sophis¬

tication nor the resources devoted to the attempt have
been sufficient to conquer the problems of poverty.
Nevertheless,

the American approach to poverty

presents a remarkable system.
claims of the least advantaged,

It recognizes certain basic
and provides a professional

class of advocates who provide for the satisfaction of
those claims and press for the acceptance of further,

as
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yet discounted,

claims.

The immediate benefits that this

system provides to the least advantaged are great,

no

matter how much better they might be;

the immediate

benefits to the powerful are marginal,

being only insurance

against a 'Vvorst possible outcome” reversal of fortune.
cost of the system to the weak is nothing;

The

the cost to the

powerful is nearly unbearable (judging by their frequent
compLaints.)

While the stability and moral benefits of a

just society are significant to the wealthy and powerful,
they have never been sufficient to induce them to pay
voluntarily the economic price for such a society.

Indeed,

it was not until this society was shocked by a global
economic crisis that bankrupted many of the rich,

that they

found it worthwhile to pay the price of insuring society,
and themselves,

against a repetition of such a crisis.

The similarity of this system and Rawls's difference
principle is significant.

Indeed,

the limits to the

similarity are those that are imposed by a society that is
not well-ordered,

and in which no veil of ignorance has

mitigated the forces of self-interest.

When the depression

made it clear that even the rich might become the least
advantaged,

the minimum position of the least advantaged

was improved.

It might well have been maximized had those

in power been less willing to gamble that they would stay in
power.

Their fears for their own positions were not strong
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enough to make their self-interest seem to lie with an
optimized worst outcome.
The arguments put forward by both sides in the debate
to change the minimum benefits are interestingly compatible
with Rawls's theory.

The rich and powerful argue that any

further increase in the guaranteed minimum will put an
unacceptable limitation on basic liberties.

Those in favor

of improving the least advantaged position respond that that
position is so weak that it must be improved in order to
allow fair (as opposed to formal)

equality of opportunity,

and that the taxation necessary to provide for transfer
payments to improve the worst position is not an infringe¬
ment on basic liberties.

Many of the near poor who do not

qualify for welfare benefits agree with the rich.
prefer the possibility of great wealth,
unlikely,

They

no matter how

to any assurance of avoiding great poverty,

spite of how likely that might be.

in

Free use of their income

with a minimum of taxes is more valuable to them than is
increasing the standard of living of the non-working poor.
While the equation of taxation with infringement upon
liberties is distinctly at variance with Rawls's easy
acceptance of taxes,
powerful.

the two other arguments are quite

Rawls would give precedence to the argument of

the least favored group.

The details of their position

only give preference to increased transfer payments when
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work is for some reason out of the question.
job is an option,
choice,

because,

When a

it is almost invariably the first
as Rawls would expect,

it helps the

individual to have greater feelings of self-respect.

73
^

The parameters in the arguments are the same as
those in Rawls's theory.
on the other hand,

The sources of disagreement,

are elements that Rawls excludes.

If the altruism that is dictated by society's JudeoChristian attitude toward helping the poor were to over¬
come the material self-interest that is so powerful in our
society,

even these should vanish.

The radical equality

implied in the commandment to "love thy neighbor as
thyself" would create a concern for the welfare of persons
in all social positions which would result in the maximin
rule and the difference principle.

The result of providing

for persons in all social positions is necessarily the
same as providing for oneself when one may occupy any of
those positions.
American welfare policies and trends have grown out
of a conflict of ideals,

misunderstanding of social forces,

and unbridled self-interest.
the ideals alone,

Projecting the effects of

stripped of the influences of misper¬

ception and personal and class bias,

I must conclude that

Rawls's theory of justice is congruent with the ideals of
welfare policy in the United States.
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JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE FINANCING
OF MEDICAL CARE

The role of government in the financing of medical
care in the United States has been a controversial aspect
of welfare policy.

The potential cost of any system of

public financing is great,

and will require that a powerful

case be made before it will be accepted.
of justice,

as an ideal

Rawls’s theory

statement of welfare policy,

should

be helpful in an attempt to determine what public respon¬
sibility exists in the field of medical care.
The first step is to place health care within the
framework of Rawls's theory.
good?

Is health care a primary

Does freedom of access to medical care come under

the first principle as a basic liberty,
clauses of the second principle?

or under one of the

Do the answers to these

questions depend on the nature of the care in question
(e.g.,

emergent vs.

cosmetic surgery)?

Only when these

questions have been answered can we decide whether the
system of financing medical care in the United States is
just,

and,

if not,

what alternatives might create a more

just system.
Health care,

as well as health,

Every rational person,
responsibility to self,
preventive care.

is a primary good.

in accordance with the principle of
may be presumed to want effective

(This position accepts the definition of
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suicide as irrational.)

Similarly,

every sick rational

person may be presumed to want the most effective possible
curative or palliative care.

This is so,

because such

care is the most prudent means of securing the natural
primary good of health.

Good health is in turn necessary

for the paramount primary good of self-respect,

because

without good health the ability to fulfill one's plan of
life is apt to be impaired.
Access to health care must be available in accordance
with the principle of equal liberties.

Rawls's conception

of the liberties covered by this principle is that

persons are at liberty to do something when they are
free from certain constraints either to do or not to
do it and when their doing it or not doing it is
protected from interference by other persons.74

Thus all persons must be free either to avail themselves of
health care,

or not to avail themselves of health care,

an equal basis,

on

and without interference from others.

Rawls defines the limits of the constraints that may be
placed upon such a liberty.

He specifically states that the

constraints that poverty and ignorance place on an indi¬
vidual's exercise of his or her liberty are considered
under the difference principle;

he does not construe these

constraints as essential infringements of liberty.

75
J

Thus establishing economic barriers to seeking health care
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is acceptable under the first principle.

Any economic

inequities that affect an individual's ability to surmount
those barriers are problems of the distribution of economic
goods and are the concern of the difference principle.
Rawls makes clear that such economic barriers may not be
inflexible.

A person may not be barred from medical care

in violation of the natural duty,
for institutions,
7 f)

danger.'

both for individuals and

to help a person who is in need or in

The limits to this duty are defined by a balance

of the urgency of the problem against the risk or loss to the
person providing aid.
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Thus,

a provider of medical care

has a duty to administer a narcotic antagonist to a person
who has just suffered an acute respiratory arrest due to an
overdose of heroin.

Similarly,

a hospital has a duty to

provide potentially life-saving therapy to the victim of a
myocardial infarction without regard to the patient's ability
to pay for that care.

This duty is limited only by the

hospital's similar duty to its other patients or potential
patients.

Excessive demands on staff or facilities might

create a situation in which not all who need care can be
treated,

so that a choice must be made as to who will re¬

ceive treatment.

If this occurs frequently,

society has a

duty to try to allocate the resources necessary to meet the
demand adequately.

Similarly,

the hospital may not simply

turn away an indigent patient with a life threatening
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problem that requires expensive care unless the assumption
of the financial burden of that care will seriously
threaten the absolute ability of the hospital to serve
others with equally serious problems.

(Such a threat is

extremely unlikely unless gross mismanagement or under¬
endowment has weakened the institution.)
The denial of medical attention for financial reasons
is also limited by the commitment made by physicians and
hospitals in assuming their roles.
7 ft

fairness'
fession,

Rawls's principle of

dictates that by voluntarily entering their pro¬

physicians have accepted the benefits and oppor¬

tunities of that profession,

and have thereby incurred an

obligation to fulfill its duties.

Both society and the

medical profession have traditionally accepted these obli¬
gations,

and have included some provision for the care of the

poor and those in urgent need among them.

Taking the Oath of

Hippocrates or formally accepting a specific code of medical
ethics may provide a basis for further obligations,

but

refraining from doing either of these things can not abridge
the basic obligations of the profession.

Similarly,

chosen to provide a certain spectrum of services,

having

hospitals

have incurred an obligation to make those services available.
These obligations,

as well as natural duty,

compel the pro¬

vision of care for the indigent.
Thus we see that health care is a primary good,

and as
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such its distribution falls within the concern of justice
as fairness.

Equal freedom of access to health care is

guaranteed to all by the principle of equal liberties.
Issues of the financing of personal health care,

on the other

hand,

.Economic

are governed by the difference principle.

limitations of access are also covered by the difference
principle,

except in situations where natural duty or

professional obligation requires that care be made avail¬
able regardless of the patient's ability to pay.
Any truly thorough application of Rawls's theory must
include consideration of all the major economic,

political,

and social institutions of the society in question.
is possible at all,
I

If it

it would be a gargantuan undertaking.

shall instead try to consider health care separately

from the economy at large.
such a separation.

There are important limits to

The fact that Medicaid benefits are

currently linked with general public assistance income
benefits points to one limit:

rational poor relief policies

require a coordinated approach to the problems of the poor.
The enormity of the health care economy suggests another
limit.

ho sector of the economy that produces over nine

percent of the gross national product can simply be plucked
neatly away from the remaining ninety-one percent.
At the same time,
such a separation.

good reasons exist for attempting

The first is practical.

It is much

^9
more manageable to approach a system as enormous and
heterogeneous as the United States economy one piece at a
time.

Once policy decisions have been made for the piece

in question,

then the problems of that piece's interfaces

with the other parts of the system can be considered.
This is how most legislation is formed,

albeit imperfectly.

A second reason for considering the health care economy
separately is tradition.

Ever since the endowment of

charitable trusts began in Elizabethan England,
of the poor such as medical care,

education,

shelter have been treated separately.
"in-kind benefits"

problems

food,

and

The provision of

incorporated into the Social Security

Act expresses a common attitude among the more advantaged
members of society:

distrust of the poor.

By providing

food stamps or Medicaid benefits society limits the purposes
for which its aid may be used.

The poor can't buy sex,

and fancy cars with in-kind benefits,

drugs,

as many of the

non-poor ungenerously fear they would with cash benefits.
For these reasons I will limit my discussion to the health
care economy and a few inevitable interfaces with the
remainder of the economy.
I will examine five possible systems of health care
financing.

The first that I will discuss is a system of

comprehensive health care for all residents.

The possibility

of some variable deductible or co-insurance provisions will
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be considered.
in use.

Next I will look at the system currently

It is a patchwork of varying state Medicaid olans

for the poor, Medicare for the elderly and certain special
patient groups,
payment plans,

a variety of private insurance and pre¬
and private out-of-pocket payments.

The

next two systems are insurance plans that have been proposed
as potential improvements to the current system.

One

provides federally funded coverage for all hospital care,
including both hospital and doctors'
deductible and coinsurance provision.

fees beyond a small
The other provides

coverage for catastrophic illnesses only,

by requiring the

payment of a large deductible that varies with the patient.'s
income.

Both of these systems would continue some of the

elements of the present system.

The last approach is a

straight income maintenance program,
special provision for medical

which makes no

care costs.

In order to apply Rawls's theory in evaluating any
of these plans,

it is necessary to identify a least

advantaged group.

Rawls suggests we use income and wealth

as an analog for a comprehensive index of primary goods,
because the latter is prohibitively hard to design.
the special case of medical care,

however,

In

the primary

good of health must receive special consideration,

as it

obviously will have a major influence on the need for care.
The problem with Rawls's suggestion in this case is that
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the correlation of health with wealth is so weak that
we cannot reasonably substitute one for both.
Using a combined measure of wealth and health we
may be able to select a least favored group.
hand,

On the other

we may be able to identify several groups each of which

is a reasonable candidate for the position of least favored.
In that case,

demonstration that all of these groups are

benefited by the inequality that causes their relative
disadvantage would be required in order to assure that the
difference principle is satisfied.

If we find that it is

quite impossible to identify a least advantaged group,

we

may be forced to guarantee equal economic access to health
care in order to comply with the difference principle.
The ideal

situation in terms of medical care is one in

which all persons have access to any medical care they need,
and in which they can afford that care without undue hard¬
ship.

Isolated from all other considerations,

situation would satisfy Rawls's two principles.
extent that illness is undeserved,

such a
To the

it would satisfy the

principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress,
which is included within the difference principle.

Rn

The simplest way to arrange such a situation is to
establish complete prepaid medical care.

All inpatient

and outpatient expenses would be billed to and paid by the
federal government.

No coinsurance or deductible payment
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would be required.
The question that justice as fairness asks here is
whether the least advantaged person is benefited maximally
in this case.

The person who is least advantaged with

respect to medical

care financing is both in need of care

and unable to afford that care without sacrificing some
other of the minimal primary goods such as food and shelter.
Assuming that levels of cash and non-medical in-kind
benefits under existing programs are barely adequate to
meet the minimal needs of healthy persons,

any welfare

recipient with any medical need would be included by such a
definition of the least favored group.

Over time,

the

least advantaged group could be expected to include all
chronic welfare recipients.

Clearly a system which pro¬

vided all necessary medical care free of charge would be
of maximal benefit to these people,

unless the expense of

the system required a reduction in the barely minimal level
of benefits provided by the welfare program.
Another group who might be considered least advantaged
are the medically indigent.
selves,

They are able to support them¬

but have unaffordably high medical expenses.

people have no crucial lack of primary goods,
that imposed by their medical bills.

These

except for

An important group

among the medically indigent are the elderly.
live on relatively low pension incomes.

Many of them

At the same time,
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their average medical bills are much higher than those
of younger persons.

These bills often force a choice

between medical care and other minimal primary goods.

The

assumption by the federal government of the medically
indigents'
them;

burden of medical expenses would clearly benefit

the assumption of that burden without any coinsurance

or deductible provisions would be of maximal benefit.

This

would be especially true for those with low incomes.
Two major conditions must be met in order to provide
this level of benefits.

The first is that the medical care

system be able to provide all the services that will be
demanded when economic constraints are removed from all
patients.

The second is that the taxation necessary to pay

for these services not lead to economic or social losses
that would harm the least advantaged group more than the
improvement in medical services would benefit them.
The assumption that the system could handle the
increased load is more reasonable than it might at first
appear.

Increased demand by people who had previously been

unable to afford care would probably amount to less than a
ten percent increase in the load on the system.

This

estimate assumes that five percent of the population are
currently receiving no medical services,
the system when care is free.

but will enter

It also assumes about a ten

percent increase in the benefits provided to current
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recipients of care under government programs,

above any

expenses they currently assume as out-of-pocket expend¬
itures.
This increase of about ten percent in total demand
would be offset by a similar decrease resulting from the
restructuring of payment provisions.

In 1975»

about

eighty percent of the population had private insurance
coverage for hospital and surgical care,

while only three

81
percent were covered for

outpatient services.

This

situation makes the out-of-pocket expenditures for out¬
patient care higher than that for similar

inpatient care,

in spite of the markedly higher total bill for the latter.
This creates an incentive to obtain the higher priced care.
In a study of over 100,000 Medicare users enrolled in
group practice prepayment plans,

patients with prepaid out¬

patient care incurred only 91% of the total charges incurred
by matched controls without such coverage.

If two plans,

members of which high out of plan expenses were paid,
excluded,

this figure drops to 83% of controls.

for

are

This

entire difference is the result of lower inpatient expenses
among the prepayment plan members,
were only 78% (all plans)

whose inpatient expenses

or 69% (excluding two plans)

of

8^
controls'

inpatient expenses.

Assuming that both physicians

and patients will learn to choose the practice pattern that
minimizes overall costs once the incentive provided by
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current insurance patterns is removed,

then we can

expect a similar reduction in per patient expenses under
a system of third party coverage of all

services.

A number of significant gains in efficiency are
inherent in such a comprehensive system.

The costs of

billing and collection by health care providers would be
lower,

since a single itemized periodic bill for all

services would be submitted to a single payment agency,
instead of the current system of bills sent to each
patient and each insuror.

A system offering total

com¬

prehensive coverage would also have no need to screen out
bills for services that were ineligible for coverage,
since there would be no ineligible services.

Additional

savings would result from the single contract nature of the
system.

Just as individual insurance policies have

administrative costs that are about three times those of
Q O

group policies,

^ so multiple group policies have higher

administrative costs than would a single "policy".
Gains in quality and cost control are also likely under
a single payment agency with power to withhold payment and
with a primary responsibility to the needs of the taxpayer/
consumer.

Quality control is possible because the payment

agency would have great leverage to affect a physician's
practice patterns.

Physicians failing to meet certain

standards could be required to get additional training or
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to get second opinions prior to surgery as a condition of
continued payment.
of the system.

Cost control would be an important part

Fee schedules could be formulated by state

medical associations,
the payment agency,

subject to review and approval by

in a manner similar to that currently

used to regulate public utility rates.

Individual

physicians might forego fee for service payments in favor
of capitation payments or straight salary arrangements.
All of these quality and cost control mechanisms have been
employed successfully by various comprehensive medical
care systems.
The usual argument against a system of this kind is
that it becomes clogged with demands for attention to minor
problems that patients currently don't find worth the
expense of medical attention.

Horror stories of long

waits for care under the British National Health Service
are presented.

While the prepayment plans in the previously

cited study only show physician utilization expenses ranging
from 2% to 26% above controls,

one study projected demand

for ambulatory physician services under comprehensive
national health insurance as high as 75% above current
levels.
It may well be necessary to provide some form of
annual deductible or coinsurance provision in order to
prevent overuse of the system.

The least advantaged must
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be exempt from such a provision,

however.

When a small

coinsurance fee was introduced by the Saskatchewan provincial
health service,

the poor markedly reduced their demand.

Those better off increased theirs,

however,

when "they knew

they wouldn't have to wait in line so long."

86

After

institution of a 2^°/° coinsurance provision in one compre¬
hensive prepaid medical care plan,
services fell over 307°-

demand for physician

At the same time,

however,

there

was a 45% decrease in enrollment among the least well paid
members of the plan,
other groups.

and no change in enrollment among all

These figures suggest that the coinsurance

provided such a barrier to the lowest paid members that
O

they no longer found the plan worthwhile.

rp

'

An acceptable

way to limit demand might be a graduated coinsurance pro¬
vision with a range from zero for the least advantaged to
25% for all those with incomes above a certain level.

In

order to prevent medical indigency,

an annual ceiling could

be placed on coinsurance payments.

The primary problem

with such a coinsurance plan is that it would be difficult
and expensive to administer.
An alternate approach would be to accept that demand
will increase,

and gear up the system to meet that demand.

Assuming that the total increase would be for attention to
complaints that could be dealt with on an outpatient basis,
it could be met by increasing the number of physicians and
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physician extenders (nurse practitioners and physician's
assistants.)
sumption,

Based on current patterns of health care con¬

even the generous estimate of a 75% increase in

demand would result in less than a 16% increase in total
personal health expenses,
were met by physicians.

even if the entire new demand
(Physicians'

services now account

for less than 21% of personal health expenditures.)

If

physician extenders met all of the increased demand,

the

cost increase would he a mere 6%.
This approach would probably present more problems
of personnel shortages than of unacceptable cost escalation.
Even these problems will be solved within about twenty
years at the current rate of physician education.

Assuming

a forty year average professional life for physicians,
number of practicing physicians in the U.S.
67% by the year 2000.

the

will increase by

This projection is also based on the

assumption that the number of new licenses issued annually
to physicians be frozen at 1980 levels.
is very conservative,
years.

Such an assumption

given the trend over the past forty

Actual changes will probably lead to an increase in

the ratio of physicians to the population of between

50%

O Q

and 75%*

it would seem likely,

then,

that the United

States medical care system as currently organized has or
will soon have the capacity to meet the demands imposed by
totally government financed health care.

59
The second assumption behind the acceptability of
such a plan is that society can stand to pay for it.

This

is more a question of economic redistribution than of costs;
we are,

after all,

currently paying almost as much as the

new system would cost.
In projecting the effects of the new system on the
federal budget and on the public tax burden I will work
from figures for fiscal year 1976 (the last year for which
complete data are available.)

In that year,

personal
Oq

health care expenditures totalled $126.2 billion.
this figure,

y

Of

$50.4 billion were paid by government programs,

and $75*7 billion were paid by private sources.^
latter figure,

Of this

only $41.3 billion were direct out-of-pocket

payments by consumers,

the remainder being paid primarily

as benefits by private health insurance organizations.
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These insurance organizations had a total premium and subscription income of $44.2 billion.
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Since the new system will cost roughly ten percent
more than the old,

it would have cost $138.8 billion had it

been in place in 1976.

All of this would have been paid

out of the federal budget.

Since the government actually

paid $50.4 billion for health care,
would have needed to be raised.

only $88.4 billion

Since there would have

been no need for private medical insurance,

all of the

premiums for it would have been available to the government
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without causing any added hardship to anyone.
that sum,

Subtracting

$44.2 billion still would have been needed.

If

the health care system is to be paid for without federal
deficit spending,
increase 14.1%.

1976 tax receipts would have had to
If a deficit had been incurred at the same

rate as the rest of the federal budget,

revenues would have

required an 11.9% increase.
This added tax burden could be distributed in various
ways.

However,

two basic approaches are currently used by

the federal government for funding social programs.

The

first is a progressively graduated tax on personal income.
The ideal behind this method is that those who have the
greatest ability to pay bear the greatest burden.
taxation generally protects the least advantaged,

Progressive
and

satisfies Rawls's difference principle.
The other approach to taxation is patterned on insurance
premiums.

Social Security is funded in this way,

with

everyone paying a fixed percentage of their incomes up to
a certain maximum annual amount.

The idea behind this

approach is that the benefits any individual can receive
from certain social programs have fixed ceilings,

and no

individual should be required to pay for a larger share of
a program than he or she may expect to use.

This form of

taxation gives the greatest advantage to the poor,

who may

receive from the program much more than they contribute;
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and to the very rich,

whose tax shrinks as a percentage of

their income at the same time as their ability to pay is
increasing.

This kind of tax violates Rawls's "lexical

difference principle"
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by allowing the lot of the most

advantaged to improve before the lot of a less advantaged
group (in this case the middle class)
Whichever approach is chosen,

has been maximized.

the effect of the tax

increase on disposable personal income is small.

If the

required $44.2 billion were derived from increased employer
and employee social insurance contributions,

the maximum

increase in employee contribution would amount to 2.6$) of
gross income.

The average tax increase would be only 2.0%

of disposable personal income.
ever,

would be passed on to

The employers'

share,

how¬

the consumer in price increases.

These would consume at least an additional 1.7% of dispos¬
able income.

The total would be at least 3.7% of dispos¬

able income.
If instead the entire sum were derived from increased
personal income taxes,
32.2%,

the average tax bill would increase

an amount equal to 4.3% of adjusted gross income or

3.7% of disposable personal income.

The

average tax

increases at various income levels is shown in table 1
(p.

62.)

The average family whose income was below the median

in 1976 of $14958,

would benefit under this system.

They

would pay less in taxes under the new system than they had
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in taxes and out-of-pocket medical expenses under the
old.

Furthermore,

the least well paid 80% of the population

would pay less with an increase in progressive tax rates
than they would pay as social insurance contributions and
increased prices.
It is extremely unlikely that the inflationary
effects of either of these tax increases would lead to any
marked social instability.
rates,

An increase in income tax

which is clearly preferable under justice as

fairness,

places the greatest burden on those with the

highest incomes.

While they are therefore the ones with

the greatest incentive to rebel against the new tax,

they

also have by far the most to lose from any major social
or economic instability.
such losses,

’While they might easily afford

the losses would probably be as great as the

cost of the tax increase.

The wealthy would thus have no

economic incentive for significantly reducing their social
and economic cooperation in order to fight the tax
increase.

The increased cost of the system is also unlikely

to cause major problems.
itures,

The actual increase in expend¬

as opposed to their redistribution,

would amount

to less than 1.1% of disposable personal income.

The

United States economy has absorbed far more inflation than
that without major instability.
Thus the two conditions that must be met in order for

64
a system of total government payment for medical care
to succeed are reasonable.
would be able to meet,

First,

the medical care system

within the near future,

load it might expect under such a program.

the increased

Second,

the

actual cost increase due to such a program would be a
relatively small burden for the economic system,

and its

creation would be unlikely to cause costly social
instability.
In contrast to this system,

the current patchwork of

medical insurance programs and out-of-pocket payments is
grossly unjust.

The care that the least advantaged groups

receive is variable,

but it is rarely as complete as the

care received by many in more advantaged groups.

State

Medicaid provisions range from non-existent in Arizona,
through varying degrees of inadequacy and limitation,
a few reasonably complete programs.
not pay for prescription drugs;
emergency hospital
prosthetic devices;

services;

to

In 1972 six states did

thirteen did not pay for

seventeen did not pay for

nineteen did not pay for clinic services;

twenty-one did not pay for physical therapy.
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A child

whose family could not afford penicillin for a strep throat
might be left to develop rheumatic heart disease;
replacement surgery became necessary years later,
be covered even though the penicillin was not.
might have to buy his or her own insulin,

and,

if valve
it would

A diabetic
after an
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amputation,

a prosthesis in order to be able to walk.

The pattern of services

provided under Medicaid is

inefficient and at times seemingly oblivious to some of
the basic medical needs of the poor.

Anyone whose medical

expenses exceed available insurance coverage is reduced
to abject poverty before becoming eligible for Medicare
or Medicaid funds.
resources,

The elderly,

with their often limited

still pay far higher out-of-pocket expenses

than those without Medicare coverage.
The shortcomings of this system are obvious,
shocking.

if not

The poor are subjected to the unnecessary risk

of early disability and death, because society does not
guarantee the availability of proven,
ments.

inexpensive treat¬

Not only is the welfare of the poor sacrificed to

save a few tax dollars,

but it is sacrificea in ways that

in the long run will waste far more dollars than were
originally saved.

The current system stands in violation

not only of Rawls's difference principle,

but also of all

three of his principles of rational choice,
of effective means,

inclusiveness,

the principles

and greater likelihood.

(This of course assumes that the objective of medical care
programs for the poor is to assure them the best possible
health.

If,

for example,

the goals of a state Medicaid

program include guaranteeing a livelihood for cardiac
surgeons,

or assuaging the public conscience at minimal
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expense,

it may be that the current system does at least

satisfy the principles of rational choice.)
The two proposed insurance systems fail to solve the
worst of these problems.

One of them would guarantee to

all residents insurance coverage similar to most Blue
Cross - Blue Shield plus major medical plans;
would provide only major medical coverage.

the other

Neither of

these programs address the issues of preventive care and
outpatient care of the poor and elderly;

they rely on the

continuation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to deal
with these problems to the extent that they now do.
Unfortunately,

these are precisely the programs that have

failed to benefit satisfactorily the least advantaged
groups.

Even those proposals which include these insurance

coverages and reform of Medicare and Medicaid would retain
the use of deductibles and coinsurance which are such strong
deterrents to the use of the system by those most in need
of its benefits.

Under such a system,

the benefits to the

least advantaged are far from maximal as required by the
difference principle.
The new insurance plans would help one group of the
least advantaged.

The plans provide some protection against

medical indigency for the middle class person who develops
a ruinously expensive illness, and who has inadequate
private insurance coverage.

The number of such persons is
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small,

however,

when compared with 45 or 50 million poor

and elderly who are inadequately served.
Thus the two insurance approaches,
system,

like the current

fail to solve the problems of providing necessary

basic services to the poor and the elderly.
of Medicare and Medicaid remain,

The problems

including the presence

of copayment provisions that discourage the least favored
from seeking care,

and the senseless denial of an ounce of

prevention while granting many pounds of attempted cure.
Provision of hospitalization coverage without outpatient
coverage perpetuates the current inefficient use of our
medical

care resources.

While inpatient care is a necessary

part of any thoroughly just system of medical care,

its

provision alone fails to remedy the largest and most
pressing violations of the difference principle and the
principles of rational choice in American medical care
financing.
The fifth approach to the problem is that of a
guaranteed minimum income with no special programs for
provision of health care.

This is the most directly

Rawlsian in that it assumes that a minimum level of income
and wealth can guarantee economic access to adequate
levels of the other primary goods.

It has the added

advantage of granting to the least advantaged group the
greatest freedom in choosing what to do with the benefits
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provided to them by society.

This is a refreshing change

from the paternalism of in-kind benefits to the poor.
the same time,

At

however,

according to the principle of

responsibility to self,

an individual's only rational

choice about medical care is to guarantee that it is avail¬
able,

whenever and in whatever degree it is needed.

A

person's failure to provide rationally for the contingency
of medical need could justify society in paternalistically
making the necessary provisions,
principles of paternalism.

according to Rawls's
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While an income policy ignores the lack of correlation
of health with money,

the minimum income would presumably

be sufficient to allow the least advantaged to purchase
health insurance,

and presumably they would do so.

Assuming

that such an income policy were adopted in the United States
today,

however,

the problem would not immediately be solved.

Unless the standard range of health insurance benefits were
changed,

the incentive to use inpatient instead of out¬

patient services would remain,

with its inherent

inefficiency.
An income maintenance policy that provided a minimum
income that could pay for health insurance would,
comprehensive care plan,
outpatient services.

like a

create an increase in demand for

Such an increase would lead to fee

increases in the current system with its lack of cost
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controls.
In our capitalist economy,

a strong income maintenance

policy would tend to benefit the rich and the poor at the
expense of those in between.

This is true even if the

minimum income is funded by a progressive scheme of tax¬
ation.

The elevated incomes of the least advantaged would

lead to increased demand throughout the economy.

Since

most members of the middle class do not have income pro¬
ducing capital investments,

they would not benefit from

the increased profitability that comes with times of high
demand.

The rich who own the means of production of most

goods and services,

stand to profit greatly in the economy,

an effect of an income maintenance policy which would tend
to counteract its cost to the rich in increased taxes.
This kind of situation,

in which the poor and rich gain

but the middle class loses,

violates Rawls's lexical

difference principle.
Thus while an adequate income policy could remedy the
worst injustices of the current medical care financing
system,

it would still fail to satisfy the principle of

effective means,

because of its reliance on traditional

hospitalization insurance.
spirit,

if not the letter,

principle.

It might also violate the
of Rawls's lexical difference
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CONCLUSIONS

John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness provides
a philosophical framework that is a reasonable ideal
against which to evaluate the ethical adequacy of
welfare policy in the United States.

It is a suitable

theory largely because of the similarity of its principles
to the motivating ideals behind American welfare policy,
which are an expression of the Lnglish heritage of our
laws and attitudes toward the poor.

Rawls's theory is

particularly helpful because it provides a clear hierarchy
of conditions that a just social institution or policy
should satisfy.
When we apply justice as fairness to the financing
of medical care in the United States,

we find that the

current system suffers from several major ethical short¬
comings.

The most important of these is its inadequate

provision for the health care of the poor and elderly.
Of four alternative financing schemes,

two providing for

increased publicly funded insurance coverage for hospital
care fail to remedy these inadequacies.

They would help

somewhat to reduce the incidence of medical indigence,
another major problem of the current system.

A third

approach would provide a guaranteed minimum income instead
of in-kind benefits.

This plan would solve the worst of

the problems of medical care for the poor and elderly.
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It would do so primarily at the expense of the middle class,
and it would not protect tne middle class from the possi¬
bility of ruinous medical bills.

The final option is a

federally funded program of comprehensive medical care
for all.

This approach solves the problem of equally

adequate care for all;

it distributes the cost of the

system fairly and in a socially bearable fashion;

it

provides the most satisfactory approach of any of the plans
to the problems of cost and quality control;

and it

provides greater rewards for efficient use of medical
resources than any of the other plans.
All four alternatives to the current situation would
improve the justice of medical care financing.

The plan

for comprehensive federally funded care is the most just
alternative,

because only it satisfies the requirement

of the difference principle of Rawls's theory.

It also

has the secondary advantage of encouraging appropriate,
rational use of resources.

Future changes in American

medical care financing should therefore be directed
toward the realization of a comprehensive system of
federally funded medical care for all persons.
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